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Optimal Power Flow
Vladimir Dvorkin, Pascal Van Hentenryck, Jalal Kazempour, Pierre Pinson
Abstract—A common belief is that distributed dispatch algo-
rithms enable privacy preservation for power system agents: each
agent optimizes its local optimization by means of primal-dual
communication without disclosing its sensitive data, e.g., load.
However, sensitive information can be inferred by a potential ad-
versary from responses of agents to communication signals over
iterations. To ensure information integrity, this paper leverages
the concept of differential privacy to develop privacy-preserving
distributed algorithms for optimal power flow (OPF) problem.
We first distribute the OPF problem using consensus alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM), and then introduce two
methods to provide differential privacy: dual and primal variable
perturbations. The perturbations are random and drawn from a
carefully parameterized Laplace distribution, such that inferring
agent data from primal-dual communication conforms to random
guessing. The main benefit is that the privacy of each agent
can be quantified and provably guaranteed up to user-specified
privacy parameters. Moreover, unlike common differentially
private algorithms, there is no privacy loss accumulated across
ADMM iterations. A series of numerical experiments across
NESTA testbeds supports our theoretical findings.
Index Terms—Alternating direction method of multipliers, Dif-
ferential privacy, Distributed optimization, Laplace mechanism,
Load Inference, Optimal power flow.
I. INTRODUCTION
Using a centralized optimization, the system operator col-
lects power system data, e.g., loads, and solves optimal power
flow (OPF) problem to find dispatch solution. Even at the
aggregated level, the release of load data poses privacy risks
for system agents. For instance, in 2016, 60 vendors in the
US offered load profiling (e.g., quantification and shaping)
of electrical appliances from aggregated load data [1], thus
compromising the privacy of individual consumers. As an
alternative, distributed algorithm have been advocated to dis-
tribute the OPF problem among power system agents, so they
exchange a limited amount of information [2]. One approach
is to distribute the OPF task among nodes (that act as agents)
that coordinate through primal-dual exchange with neighbors
[3]–[6]. The clear benefit is that agents communicate only
certain variables, keeping loads private. The privacy, though,
remains at risk, as loads can be revealed from communications,
particularly when subproblems admit closed-form solutions,
as in [6]. Hence, distributed OPF needs to be augmented with
additional privacy-preserving practices to enhance integrity.
Differential privacy, first formalized by Dwork et al. [7], [8],
is a framework that allows to quantify the privacy risk associ-
ated with computing functions (queries) on datasets compris-
ing sensitive information. The original concept provides strong
guarantees (up to user-specified privacy parameter) that the
removal or addition of a single item in a dataset will not allow
an adversary to distinguish the presence of this item from the
query output. More recent metric-based differential privacy
by Chatzikokolakis et al. [9], offer, instead, masking the
magnitude of dataset items from a query output. For example,
instead of hiding the presence of load, one can protect the
value of this load up to a specified parameter. Commonly,
the privacy guarantees spring out from the so-called Laplace
mechanism that perturbs query output with the noise drawn
from the Laplace distribution defined in the sensitivity of the
output to the items in a dataset. Hence, a differentially private
mechanism is necessarily random, as for a given dataset its
output obeys a particular probability distribution.
In the optimization context, differential privacy has been
applied to empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem, which
is a simple instance of unconstrained optimization. Chaudhuri
et al. [10] develop a differentially private mechanism to
solve centralized ERM problem. Here, the ERM problem
casts as a query, and either output or objective Laplace-
based perturbations achieve privacy of training data. Zhang
et al. [11] extend the application to a version of ERM based
on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM)
that provides privacy to each subproblem (node) comprising
sensitive training data. In this distributed context, the privacy
follows from perturbations of either primal or dual variables
at every iteration. The drawback of [11] is a privacy loss
induced by every new iteration, as more information revealed.
Therefore, [11] offers guarantees only for a single iteration.
Zhang et al. [12] minimize the loss by finding tighter bounds
on the sensitivity of subproblems, but the guarantees still apply
to a finite number of iterations.
In power systems, differential privacy is used to release OPF
testbeds from the real network involving sensitive data [13]–
[15]. Zhou et al. [13] explore the monotonicity properties of
the OPF problem to release the entire system data privately
for DC OPF studies. Fioretto et al. in [14] and [15] offer
mechanisms to release load and transmission parameters in the
context of AC OPF with a special emphasis on restoring the
feasibility of OPF solution. There are also a few applications
of differential privacy to operational problems. Zhao et al. [16]
show that battery-based load hiding problem fails to achieve
load privacy with available smart metering data, and offer dif-
ferentially private setup to mask the actual load of appliances.
Han et al. [17] build a privacy-aware distributed algorithm
for electrical vehicle charging, compromising the inference of
actual charging power from communication signals.
In this work, we explore the use of differential privacy in the
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the node-wise decomposition of the 3-node power
network: the original network on the left, and its mirrored decomposed
counterpart on the right. The original network is restored when enforcing
consensus constraints for every node across its neighborhood.
context of distributed OPF problem based on the consensus-
ADMM as in [3] and [4]. In the underlying problem, the agents
(nodes) negotiate voltage angle variables without disclosing
loads. However, we show that there exist privacy-violating
conditions that allow an adversary with side information to
infer the load from agent response to input signals. Motivated
by this scenario, we propose privacy-preserving ADMM algo-
rithms for the distributed OPF:
1) We devise two privacy-preserving ADMM algorithms
using primal and dual variable perturbations (Algorithms
1 and 2, respectively). In the former, the output of agent
subproblems is perturbed with a noise respecting its
sensitivity to load. In the latter, the subproblem of each
agent is perturbed itself by injecting a properly calibrated
noise to dual variables before solving the optimization.
2) We derive theoretical guarantees (Theorems 2 and 3)
that the two algorithms provide differential privacy up to
user-specified privacy parameters. Furthermore, we show
that there is no additional privacy loss (information gain)
induced with additional ADMM iterations (Theorem 4).
3) Using a series of power system testbeds, we explore the
practical use of differential privacy. First, we show that
with a fine tuning of privacy parameters, the inference of
loads from primal-dual communication conforms to ran-
dom guessing. On the other hand, the recorded optimality
loss induced due to noisy responses limits the application
only to nodes with smaller sensitivities.
The remainder is outlined as follows. In Sections II and
III, we streamline ADMM-based OPF problem and associated
privacy risks. Section IV presents the main contributions
on privacy-preserving OPF algorithms. Section V presents
supporting numerical experiments. Section VI concludes.
II. ADMM-BASED DISTRIBUTED OPF
We consider a high-voltage power network modeled by an
undirected graph Γ (B,Λ), where B is the set of nodes and Λ
is the set of transmission lines connecting those nodes. Using
the DC power flow model, susceptance β ∈ R
|Λ|
+ and capacity
f ∈ R
|Λ|
+ describe transmission lines. We use mapping func-
tions s : Λ 7→ B and r : Λ 7→ B to return sending and receiving
ends of transmission lines, respectively. The last network
descriptor is the susceptance matrix B ∈ R|B|×|B|, whose
non-diagonal elements amount to the negative susceptance of
the corresponding line, and diagonal elements sum up to the
susceptance of all adjacent lines. Vector d ∈ R
|B|
+ collects
controllable loads that can be adjusted in both directions by
s ∈ R|B| within a range [d, d] ∈ R|B|. The cost of adjustment
follows quadratic function s⊤Qs, where Q ∈ R
|B|×|B|
+ is a
diagonal matrix with entries denoted as qi. This adjustment
is assumed to be offset by any mean of flexibility, e.g.,
demand response or distributed energy resources, behind the
transmission-distribution interface. More explicit modeling of
this flexibility is provided in [18], which is compatible with the
proposed algorithms. The generation nodes output p ∈ R
|B|
+
within a range [p, p] at costs described by second- and first-
order coefficients collected in C2 ∈ R
|B|×|B|
+ and c1 ∈ R
|B|
+ ,
where C2 is a diagonal matrix with entries denoted as c2i. The
optimal power flow solution constitutes the generator and load
set-points so as a vector θ ∈ R|B| of voltage angles provided
by solving
min
p,s,θ
p⊤C2p+ c
⊤
1 p+ s
⊤Qs (1a)
s.t. − f l 6 βl
(
θs(l) − θr(l)
)
6 f l, ∀l ∈ Λ, (1b)
p 6 p 6 p, d 6 s 6 d, (1c)
Bθ = p+ s− d, (1d)
where (1a) minimizes the total generation and load adjustment
cost, (1b) limits power flows, (1c) bounds controllable power,
and (1d) balances nodal power injections. Following [3], [4],
the OPF in (1) admits a suitable distributed scheme, where
nodes act as agents. Fig. 1 shows the OPF problem distribution
among nodes by means of duplicating voltage angles, i.e., θ ∈
R
|B| ⇒ θ ∈ R|B|×|B|, whose columns collect agent estimates
of voltage angles across the network. The scheme enforces
θ = θi : µi, ∀i ∈ B, (2)
where θ ∈ R|B| is the consensus variable, θi ∈ R
|B| is the ith
column of the matrix of duplicated voltage angles θ, and µi ∈
R
|B| is the i−specific vector of dual variables. By dualizing
(2) and adding the corresponding proximal term, we obtain the
OPF problem suitable for agent-wise ADMM decomposition:
max
µ
min
p,s,θ,θ
L
(
p, s, θ, θ, µ
)
:= p⊤C2p+ c
⊤
1 p+ s
⊤Qs
+
∑
i∈B
µ⊤i
(
θ − θi
)
+ 12
∑
i∈B
‖θ − θi‖
2
ρ
s.t. p, s, θ ∈
⋃
i∈B
Oi,
where Oi is a i−specific subspace of (1b)-(1d), norm ‖x‖
2
ρ
reads as x⊤diag (ρ)x, and ρ ∈ R
|B|
+ is a penalty factor that is
assumed constant across ADMM iterations. By denoting the
iteration counter by ν, the distributed variant of OPF problem
in (1) formulates as follows [19]:
θνi ← argmin
pi,si,θi∈Oi
L
(
pi, si, θi, θ
ν91
, µν91i
)
, (4a)
θ
ν
← argmin
θ
L
(
θν , θ, µν91
)
, (4b)
µνi ← µ
ν91
i + ρ
(
θ
ν
− θνi
)
. (4c)
The convergence is recorded whenever the difference be-
tween consensus variables and agent local estimates is reduced
to some user-specified tolerance γ, i.e.,
∑
i∈B
‖θ
ν
− θνi ‖ 6 γ. (4d)
Notice that the algorithms in (4) solely requires exchanging
primal and dual variables of (2) across ADMM iterations.
III. PRIVACY RISK AND ATTACK MODELS
Although loads are not exchanged across ADMM iterations,
the privacy risk still exists. Here, we show that under certain
conditions the loads can be inferred from agent responses. We
narrow down our scope to two types of nodes:
1. PV-node with a controllable generator and fixed load. The
flexibility is solely provided by the generator.
2. PQ-node with a controllable load and no generation. The
flexibility is solely provided by the ability of the load to
adjust the consumption within available range.
This scope is not restrictive as any node is representable
by a combination of nodes above in a lossless DC power flow
model. The presence of a flexible resource at the attacked node
is a prerequisite to provide privacy. For example, the load at
PV-node is expressed from (1d) as di = B
⊤
i θ
ν
i − p
ν
i . Even
knowing flow injections, the attacker cannot infer the load as
generator set-points are not exchanged.
The information assumed possibly available to the attacker
amounts to: (i) cost function of the flexible resource at the
attacked node, (ii) network topology and transmission data
and (iii) algorithm data such as factor ρ and the structure
of agent optimization problems. This information suffices for
the successful inference of the load when intercepting agent
communications. Indeed, the stationarity conditions, obtained
in Appendix A, can be used to build the inference model that
returns load estimates as a function of optimization parameters
and agent responses. The estimates of load at node i are
collected in vector dˆνi ∈ R
|Ni| of dimension |Ni|. In particular,
for any node j in the neighborhoodNi, the load at the attacked
node i is obtained at some iteration ν as:
dˆνij =
µν91ij + ρ(θ
ν91
j − θ
ν
ij)− c1iBij
2c2iBij
−B⊤i θ
ν
i
+
1
2c2i
[
λp,νi − λ
p,ν
i −
∑
l∈Λi
Li(j,l)λ
f,ν
l βl
]
, (5a)
dˆνij =
µν91ij + ρ(θ
ν91
j − θ
ν
ij)
2qiBij
−B⊤i θ
ν
i
+
1
2qi
[
λd,νi − λ
d,ν
i −
∑
l∈Λi
Li(j,l)λ
f,ν
l βl
]
, (5b)
where (5a) and (5b) relate to PV-node and PQ-node, respec-
tively. In (5a) and (5b), the last terms include the dual vari-
ables associated with capacity limits of the flexible resource
(λ
(·),ν
i , λ
(·),ν
i ) of node i and thermal capacity of the adjacent
transmission lines (λ
f,ν
l ) (see Appendix A for the details).
Remark 1. As the true load is unknown to the attacker,
the dual variables of local constraints can not be deduced.
Therefore, the only case when attack models in (5) provide a
meaningful result (i.e., dˆνij = di, ∀j ∈ Ni) is when the duals
are zero (the last terms in (5a) and (5b) amount to zero).
Hence, we define the following privacy-violating conditions.
Condition 1. The flexible resource of the attacked node i is
deployed strictly between its limits, i.e., ∃ ν, s.t. λp,νi = λ
p,ν
i =
0 for PV-node and ∃ ν, s.t. λd,νi = λ
d,ν
i = 0 for PQ-node.
Condition 2. The capacity of transmission lines connected to
node i is not binding, i.e., ∃ ν, s.t. λ
f,ν
l = 0, ∀l ∈ Λi.
Remark 2. Conditions 1 and 2 are often hold jointly in
some intermediate ADMM iterations where power flow and
flexibility limits are not yet binding. Therefore, the privacy
has to be preserved at those iterations.
We can now state the problem.
Problem. Devise the privacy-preserving variant of distributed
OPF in (4) that does not allow for disclosure of agent loads
under Conditions 1 and 2 at any iteration.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR DISTRIBUTED OPF
Here, we review a necessary background on differential
privacy and offer two privacy-preserving ADMM algorithms.
A. Differential privacy
The goal of differential privacy is to protect agent datasets
containing sensitive information. In the context of this work,
the dataset Di of agent i includes parameters used in local
optimization. We consider agent local optimizations (4a) as
queries Qi : Di 7→ θi that map agent data into voltage
angle estimates. The concept of differential privacy suggests to
randomize the output of the queries such that an adversary will
not be able to distinguish what dataset Di is used to compute
θi. Consider two adjacent (different in one value) datasets Di
and D′i that can be made indistinguishable on random query
up to some constant α according to the following definition.
Definition 1 (α-adjacency of two datasets [9]). Two datasets
D = {ek}
n
k=1 and D
′ = {e′k}
n
k=1 are said to be α-adjacent
for some α > 0, i.e., D ∼α D
′, if there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that ‖ek − e
′
k‖1 6 α and ej = e
′
j, ∀j 6= k.
The adjacency α is chosen according to the privacy require-
ment and may be set, for example, to some portion of load,
e.g., 50%, to hide any change in a given load amounting up
to α. A randomized query that acts on a dataset is said to be
differential private up to some value ǫ, if it guarantees that
an adversary will not be able to distinguish what dataset, e.g.,
D or D′, has been used to compute the query output. The
following gives more formal definition.
Algorithm 1 Primal perturbation (PP-ADMM)
Input: agent data: Di; privacy parameters: ǫi, αi; algorithmic data:
γ, ρ, ν, starting point: θ
0
, µ0.
Output: ǫi−differentially private distributed OPF solution.
Step 1: find ∆i using (7), draw ξi ∈ Lap(∆i/ǫi), ∀i.
Step 2: update θνi using (4a), ∀i.
Step 3: perturb output according to θ˜νi ← θ
ν
i + ξi,∀i.
Step 4: update θ
ν
using (4b) and perturbed outputs θ˜νi , ∀i.
Step 5: update µνi using (4c) and perturbed outputs θ˜
ν
i , ∀i.
Step 6: stop if
∑
i∈B
‖θ
ν
− θ˜νi ‖ 6 γ or ν = ν, o/w go to Step 2.
Definition 2 (ǫ−differential privacy [9]). A randomized query
Q˜ : S 7→ R with domain S and range R preserves
ǫ−differential privacy if for any output Θ ∈ R and all adjacent
datasets D ∼α D
′ ∈ S for a fixed α > 0, it holds that
P
[
Q˜(D) ∈ Θ
]
6 P
[
Q˜(D′) ∈ Θ
]
exp(ǫ),
where probability is taken over runs of Q˜.
The user-specified ǫ > 0 is called privacy loss. Both privacy
loss ǫ and adjacency α allow for quantifying and controlling
the privacy risk. In particular, the stronger privacy is achieved
with smaller values of ǫ and larger values of α.
According to the sensitivity-based method by Dwork et al.
[8], a query can be made differential private by injecting a
carefully calibrated noise to its output. The amount of noise
depends on the sensitivity of the query to changes in a dataset.
Definition 3 (Sensitivity of queries [8]). The sensitivity of a
query Q(D), denoted as ∆Q, amounts to the optimal solution
of the following optimization problem:
∆Q := max
D,D′
‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖1 s.t. ‖D−D
′‖1 6 α, (6)
where D and D′ are two α-adjacent datasets in the query
domain defined according to Definition 1.
According to [8], the noise is provided by a zero-mean
Laplace distribution, denoted by Lap (λ), with scale λ and
probability density function f(x|λ) = 12λexp (−|x|/λ).
Theorem 1 (Laplace mechanism [8]). Let Q : D 7→ R be
a query that maps dataset D to real numbers. The Laplace
mechanism that outputs Q (D) + ξ, where ξ ∼ Lap (∆Q/ǫ),
achieves ǫ−differential privacy.
Hence, by adding a sensitivity-cognizant noise to the query
output, an adversary cannot distinguish what dataset is used
to compute the query. In what follows, we propose two ran-
domized versions of the ADMM algorithm in (4) that preserve
load privacy according to the sensitivity-based method.
B. Primal perturbation algorithm (PP-ADMM)
In this algorithm, the output of agent queries is perturbed
by the noise calibrated respecting the sensitivity of the output
to load. Therefore, for every agent i we consider two loads di
and d′i different up to αi > 0. The load sensitivity of agent
i, denoted as ∆i ∈ R
|N|i , computes with respect to every
Algorithm 2 Dual perturbation (DP-ADMM)
Input: agent data: Di; privacy parameters: ǫi, αi; algorithmic data:
γ, ρ, ν, starting point: θ
0
, µ0.
Output: ǫi−differentially private distributed OPF solution.
Step 1: find ∆˜i using (9), draw ξi ∈ Lap(∆˜i/ǫi), ∀i.
Step 2: perturb duals according to µ˜ν91i ← µ
ν91
i + ξi, ∀i.
Step 3: update θνi using (4a) and µ˜
ν91
i , ∀i.
Step 4: update θ
ν
according to (4b).
Step 5: update µνi ,∀i according to (4c).
Step 6: stop if (4d) holds or ν = ν, o/w go to Step 2.
node in the neighborhood. The agent load sensitivities share
an important property, i.e.,
Proposition 1. Whenever Conditions 1-2 hold, the load sen-
sitivity of each agent is constant across ADMM iterations.
Proof. Under Conditions 1-2, the dual variables of local
constraints in stationary conditions (11) in Appendix A amount
to zero. Then, if we consider the difference of two sets of
conditions (11) for agent i enforced on adjacent loads di and
d′i, respectively, we see that this difference is independent from
dual and consensus variables µi and θ. As there are no more
varying parameters, we see that ∆i := ‖θi (di) − θi (d
′
i)‖1
remains constant across ADMM iterations.
As sensitivities are independent from dual and consensus
variables, we compute them for each agent i as
∆i := ‖θi (di)− θi (d
′
i)‖1, for ‖di − d
′
i‖1 6 αi, (7)
where θi(d˜i) for some load value d˜i obtains as
θi ∈ argmin
pi,θi
c2ip
2
i + c1ipi +
1
2‖θi‖
2
ρ s.t. B
⊤
i θi = pi − d˜i
for PV-nodes, and
θi ∈ argmin
si,θi
qis
2
i +
1
2‖θi‖
2
ρ s.t. B
⊤
i θi = si − d˜i
for PQ-nodes, where dual and consensus variables µi and θ
are set to zero. Now, we outline the first privacy-preserving
distributed OPF summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. Dual perturbation algorithm (DP-ADMM)
As apposed to query output perturbation, it has been pro-
posed to perturb a query itself [10]. The experiments in
[11] and [12] demonstrate that in the distributed setting,
the objective function perturbation is preferred over primal
output due to better convergence properties. Following this
rationale, we introduce a randomize ADMMwith dual variable
perturbations summarized in Algorithm 2. The goal of DP-
ADMM is to maintain the same probability distribution of
query output as in PP-ADMM by carefully calibrating the
noise applied to the dual variables. More formally, we aim
at maintaining the following probability density function of
query outputs
f(θ˜ij |Di) =
1
2∆ij/ǫi
exp
(
− ǫi∆ij ‖ξij − θij‖1
)
, ∀j ∈ Ni, (8)
which is centered around the true agent response with the scale
corresponding to the sensitivity (7) and privacy coefficient.
To achieve (8) through dual perturbation, we explore the
primal-dual relationship provided by the stationarity conditions
in (11). Fortunately, they establish a linear and constant
dependency of primal response on dual variable for agent i,
e.g., θij ∝ µij/[2c2iB
2
ij + ρ], j ∈ Ni for PV-nodes. Hence,
agent queries output according to (8) by perturbing the dual
variables with the noise drawn from Lap(∆˜ij/ǫi), where
∆˜ij := ∆ij [2c2iB
2
ij + ρ], j ∈ Ni (9a)
for PV-nodes, and similarly
∆˜ij := ∆ij [2qiB
2
ij + ρ], j ∈ Ni (9b)
for PQ-nodes.
D. Privacy guarantees
We provide the following guarantees for the two randomized
variants of the distributed OPF problem in (4).
Theorem 2. Under privacy-violating Conditions 1 and 2, PP-
ADMM preserves ǫi−differential privacy.
Proof. Consider a probability density function of the agent
randomized response in PP-ADMM f(θ˜ij |Di) computed on
dataset Di, that includes all necessary parameters to compute
response under Condition 1 and 2. For any adjacent dataset D′i
defined according to Definition 1, and for the given distribution
of noise Lap (λi) with scale λi, the following holds:
f(θ˜ij |Di)
f(θ˜ij |D′i)
=
exp
(
−λ−1i ‖ξij − θij‖1
)
exp
(
−λ−1i ‖ξij − θ
′
ij‖1
)
= exp
(
λ−1i
(
‖ξij − θ
′
ij‖1 − ‖ξij − θij‖1
))
6 exp
(
λ−1i
(
‖θ′ij − θij‖1
))
,
where the last inequality holds due to triangle inequality of
norms. As θ′ij and θij are true agent responses computed,
respectively, on D′i and Di adjacent datasets, we have that
‖θ′ij − θij‖1 = ∆ij due to Proposition 1. Finally, we know
that in PP-ADMM the noise is scaled with λi = ∆ij/ǫi, so
we eventually arrive to
f(θ˜ij |Di) 6 f(θ˜ij |D
′
i)exp (ǫi) ,
as required by Definition 2.
Theorem 3. Under privacy-violating Conditions 1 and 2, DP-
ADMM preserves ǫi−differential privacy.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 2 and the fact that
the agent subproblems in DP-ADMM outputs according to the
same probability density function as in PP-ADMM.
Unlike in many privacy-preserving distributed algorithms,
e.g. in [11], [12] and [17], the agents in Algorithms 1 and 2
draw samples only once before the start of iterations. This is
due to a distinctive feature of distributed OPF in (4), where
the sensitivity of agent responses to loads does not depend on
the parameters updated over iterations (see Proposition 1). It
leads us to the following results.
Theorem 4. Using Algorithms 1 and 2, whenever Conditions
1 and 2 hold, there is no additional privacy loss (information
gain) accumulated over iteration. More formally, dˆνi − dˆ
k
i = 0,
for agent i and ∀ν 6= k.
Proof. For two subsequent iterations, where Conditions 1 and
2 hold, the difference between observed load expresses as a
function of input and output communication signals, i.e.,
dˆνi − dˆ
ν91
i = dˆ
ν
i (µ
ν91
i , θ
ν91
, θ˜νi )− dˆ
ν
i (µ
ν92
i , θ
ν92
, θ˜ν91i ) (10a)
for PP-ADMM Algorithm 1, and
dˆνi − dˆ
ν91
i = dˆ
ν
i (µ˜
ν
i , θ
ν91
, θνi )− dˆ
ν
i (µ˜
ν91
i , θ
ν92
, θν91i ) (10b)
for DP-ADMM Algorithm 2, where ·˜ stands for perturbed
variable with noise ξi. By expressing B
⊤
i θi from (11) and
substituting it into (10), it finds that dˆνi − dˆ
ν91
i ∝ (ξi− ξi) = 0
for the two algorithms. The same applies to any iteration pair,
i.e., dˆνi − dˆ
k
i = 0, ν 6= k, for which Conditions 1-2 hold.
Finally, we notice that the feasibility of OPF solution is not
affected by either primal or dual perturbations. Indeed, Al-
gorithm 1 solely perturbs the objective function of consensus
optimization (4b) while Algorithm 2 solely perturbs the agent
objective function in (4a). The perturbations, though, may
affect the Lipschitz continuity of objective functions, therefore
influencing the convergence of distributed OPF. However, our
experiments show that this is not the case for a series of power
system networks even at scale, as we show it next.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
The experiments are performed on power system testbeds
available with PowerModels.jl v0.12.2 [20] using JuMP.jl
v0.19.2 [21]. All data and codes are relegated to the e-
companion [22]. By default, we select model parameters ǫ =
1, ν = 104, ρ = 103, γ = 5×10−2, qi = 10, and c2i = 0.01c1i
if not provided in the testbed. We first demonstrate the privacy
risks in the face of attack in Section V-A. Then, we provide
an illustration of privacy-preservation algorithms in Section
V-B, and examine their cost and algorithmic performance in
Sections V-C and V-D, respectively.
A. Exploring privacy risks
We show that attack models (5) suffice to disclose the
actual load values from the ADMM communications when no
privacy-preserving measures are used. In differential privacy
terms, the privacy loss in this case amounts to ǫ → ∞.
In the interest of illustration, we run the base ADMM with
ν = 104, ρ = 102, γ = 5× 10−2, qi = 10
2. Fig. 2 displays the
instance of load inference at the second node of the IEEE
14-node RTS using attack model (5a). Here, Condition 1
required for the successful attack holds during the most of
iterations, whereas Condition 2 always holds due to sufficient
capacity of adjacent transmission lines. Furthermore, the right
plot displays the frequency of observed values over iterations
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Fig. 2. Load inference across iterations of ADMM in (4) at PV-node 2 of
the IEEE 14-node RTS. The actual load is disclosed when Condition 1 holds.
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF ATTACKS:NL− NUMBER OF LOADS IN THE SYSTEM,
N IL− NUMBER OF INFERRED LOADS, AND SUCCESS RATE IN %.
system NL N IL % system NL N IL %
3_lmbd 3 3 100 30_ieee 22 22 100
5_pjm 5 4 80.0 39_epri 29 29 100
14_ieee 12 12 100 57_ieee 42 40 95.2
24_ieee 20 10 50.0 118_ieee 108 99 91.2
30_as 24 24 100 200_tamu 157 108 68.7
30_fsr 24 24 100 500_tamu 290 200 68.9
disclosing the actual load as the most frequent one. The similar
privacy risks exist in other networks according to the results
in Table I. The violation of load privacy is recorded if the true
value of load has been observed across 10% of iterations or
more. Even for the real-size instances, the privacy risks exist
for the majority of loads. However, using Algorithms 1 and
2, the privacy loss can be controlled allowing for hiding the
actual load during the attack, as we show it next.
B. Preserving privacy: illustrative examples
We use the IEEE 118-node RTS, where the privacy is
provided for selected PV and PQ nodes. The privacy loss is
controlled by choosing ǫ = 1 and varying adjacency αi ∈ {∼
0, 10, 30, 50}%. Fig. 3 explains how privacy can be controlled
through a fine tuning of parameter αi. When αi ∼ 0, the
noise induced by Laplace mechanism practically amounts to
zero rendering the randomized Algorithm 2 as its deterministic
counterpart in (4), thus disclosing the actual load value. With
increasing αi, the agent responses obey certain probability
distributions, such that at every run of ADMM an adversary
only observes some samples from the induced distributions.
We notice that ǫ = 1 is a suitable choice as the majority of
probability mass in Fig. 3 is contained within the range of ±αi
centered around the actual load value. The probability density
of observed loads across 1000 simulation rounds significantly
flattens in αi, thus bringing the performance of privacy attacks
closer to that of random guessing. With Fig. 4, we further show
that both privacy-preserving algorithms achieve the same load
distributions providing the same privacy guarantees in practice.
Finally, we notice that the presence of loads and their
installed capacities are often common knowledge. Therefore,
large values of adjacency, e.g., 30%-50% are likely unneces-
sary. To provide privacy in a reasonable way, we consider α
up to 15% that hides the actual load in a range up to ±15%.
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Fig. 3. Distributions of estimated loads at PQ-node 42 (left), PV-node 59
(middle) and PQ-node 116 (right) of the IEEE 118-node RTS when Conditions
1-2 hold. The results are obtained for 103 simulation runs of Algorithm 2.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of estimated load at PV-node 59 of the IEEE 118-node
RTS yielded by PP-ADMM and DP-ADMM when Conditions 1 and 2 hold.
C. Optimality loss vs. privacy
As Laplace mechanism produces larger noise for stronger
privacy requirements, the optimality of the OPF solution
reduces, as shown in Tables II and III. Table II reports the
optimality loss when assigning α uniformly over all PV nodes
in the system. Although the loss is case-dependent, there is
a general trend that the smaller the density of PV-nodes,
the smaller the optimality loss. Moreover, in all cases, the
optimality loss in percentage does not exceed the adjacency ex-
pressed in percentage. Hence, the privacy-preserving ADMM
Algorithms 1 and 2 provide more privacy than lost optimality.
When it comes to privacy preservation of individual PV-nodes,
perturbations of agent response do not significantly affect the
optimality of OPF solution. When providing privacy for the
entire set of controllable loads, the optimality loss exceeds
several orders of magnitude. This is mainly due to generally
larger sensitivities of PQ nodes and their dominant position
in our setup. When it comes to individuals nodes, the loss is
network-specific as reported in Table III. It only makes sense
to provide privacy for the loads with smaller sensitivities to
minimize system-wide impacts. These results are consistent
with those of Zhou et al. [13], i.e., the extend to which privacy
can be provided in a meaningful way (in a least-cost way in
our case) significantly depends on the network of interest.
TABLE II
AVERAGE OPTIMALITY LOSS WHEN PROVIDING PRIVACY FOR PV-NODES
FOR VARYING ADJACENCY α. ALL IN %.
case1/α 5 10 15 case/α 5 10 15
3_lmbd 0.0 0.1 0.3 30_fsr 0.0 0.1 0.2
5_pjm 0.8 3.2 5.1 30_ieee 0.1 0.3 0.5
14_ieee 0.2 0.6 1.1 39_epri 0.1 0.4 1.1
24_ieee 2.0 5.3 9.0 57_ieee 0.2 2.2 3.5
30_as 1.5 5.1 5.4 118_ieee 3.4 8.1 11.4
1 loads at PV-nodes of 200 and 500_tamu systems amount to zero.
TABLE III
AVERAGE OPTIMALITY LOSS IN % WHEN PROVIDING PRIVACY FOR
PQ-NODES WITH MIN, AVERAGE, AND MAX SENSITIVITIES (α = 10%).
case/∆ min avr max case/∆ min avr max
3_lmbd 120.7 134.7 139.5 30_ieee 0.4 6.4 44.4
5_pjm 88.7 94.2 85.9 39_epri 0.0 48.4 100.4
14_ieee 0.7 19.8 79.4 57_ieee 0.0 0.0 56.3
24_ieee 6.2 46.2 53.6 118_ieee 0.4 26.0 119.0
30_as 17.9 21.0 77.0 200_tamu 0.7 0.7 92.6
30_fsr 20.8 37.0 67.9 500_tamu 0.3 91.9 143.9
TABLE IV
ALGORITHMIC PERFORMANCE (NUMBER OF ITERATIONS) OF THE
PRIVACY-PRESERVING ALGORITHMS ACROSS 100 RUNS.
case -ADMM αi ∼ 0%
αi = 10%
min avr max
3_lmbd
PP
42
42 42 42
DP 42 42 42
5_pjm
PP
85
75 95 175
DP 75 84 116
14_ieee
PP
492
457 491 518
DP 460 491 520
24_ieee
PP
771
316 735 1040
DP 314 726 1430
30_as
PP
440
320 401 460
DP 321 410 478
30_fsr
PP
247
247 247 247
DP 247 247 247
30_ieee
PP
855
834 855 874
DP 750 854 989
39_epri
PP
2320
1973 2307 2387
DP 2237 2316 2370
57_ieee
PP
1679
1671 2050 2525
DP 1545 2084 2658
118_ieee
PP
1836
1673 2007 2515
DP 1596 3219 12526
D. Computational performance
The two algorithms demonstrate similar convergence statis-
tics when providing privacy to loads at PV-nodes as reported
in Table IV. From the computational point of view, the non-
congested networks, e.g. 3_lmbd and 30_fsr, are immune
to the noisy responses of agents, and therefore the privacy
preservation does not require extra computational effort. In the
congested networks, the computational complexity remains the
same only in expectation. Only at scale, e.g., on the 57_ieee
and 118_ieee testbeds, we see that the primal perturbation
algorithm outperforms the one based on the dual perturbation.
Nonetheless, both algorithms require extra amount of iterations
compared to the privacy-agnostic ADMM.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents two algorithms to provide differential
privacy for agents acting in the framework of ADMM-based
optimal power flow problem. The proposed algorithms provide
theoretical privacy guarantees for loads in the face of adverse
load inference preventing privacy leakage throughout ADMM
iterations. The privacy achieves through either primal or
dual variable perturbations calibrated by user-specified privacy
parameters. A series of experiments on NESTA benchmark
networks unfold the trade-off between privacy and optimality
of OPF solution. When providing privacy for loads sited at
generator nodes, the privacy gain always exceeds optimality
loss in percentage. On the other hand, we found that the
sensitivity of many (but not all) controllable loads at PQ-
nodes is too large to provide privacy in a cost-efficient manner.
Our future effort is to explore stronger differentially private
distributed protocols immune to any information available to
the attacker, including capacity limits. It can be achieved, for
instance, using constraint perturbations, where the additional
challenge of satisfying OPF feasibility arises.
APPENDIX
A. Supporting derivations of agent subproblems
Consider a PV-node i comprising a generator and uncon-
trollable load solving the following optimization problem:
min
pi,θi
c2ip
2
i + c1ipi − µ
⊤
i θi +
1
2‖θ − θi‖
2
ρ
s.t. B⊤i θi = pi − di, pi 6 pi 6 pi : (λ
p
i , λ
p
i ),
βl
(
θis(l) − θir(l)
)
6 f l : λ
f
l , ∀l ∈ Λ,
where Bi is an i
th column of susceptance matrix, and the
variables after the colon sign are duals of corresponding
constraints. By expressing pi = B
⊤
i θi + di, we obtain the
optimization in θi variables only. The stationarity conditions
of the resulting problem are given as
∂L
∂θi
= 2c2i
[
B⊤i θi + di
]
Bi + c1iBi − µi − ρθ + ρθi
−λpiBi + λ
p
iBi + Li[λ
f
◦ β] = 0, (11a)
where ◦ is a Schur product, and Li is a |B| × |Λ| matrix, s.t.
Li(j,l) =


1, if j = i,
−1, if j ∈ Ni\i, r(l) = j,
0, otherwise.
Similarly, for a PQ-node, the agent optimizes
min
pi,θi
qis
2
i − µ
⊤
i θi +
1
2‖θ − θi‖
2
ρ
s.t. B⊤i θi = si − di, di 6 si 6 di : (λ
d
i , λ
d
i ),
βl
(
θis(l) − θir(l)
)
6 f l : λ
f
l , ∀l ∈ Λ.
By expressing si = B
⊤
i θi + di, we obtain conditions
∂L
∂θi
= 2qi
[
B⊤i θi + di
]
Bi − µi − ρθ + ρθi
−λdiBi + λ
d
iBi + Li[λ
f
◦ β] = 0. (11b)
REFERENCES
[1] M. C. Baechler and H. Hao, “Business case for nonintrusive load
monitoring,” Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA
(United States), Tech. Rep., 2016.
[2] D. K. Molzahn, F. Dörfler, H. Sandberg, S. H. Low, S. Chakrabarti,
R. Baldick, and J. Lavaei, “A survey of distributed optimization and
control algorithms for electric power systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 2941–2962, 2017.
[3] A. J. Conejo and J. A. Aguado, “Multi-area coordinated decentralized
DC optimal power flow,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 13,
no. 4, pp. 1272–1278, 1998.
[4] P. N. Biskas, A. G. Bakirtzis, N. I. Macheras, and N. K. Pasialis, “A
decentralized implementation of DC optimal power flow on a network
of computers,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 20, no. 1, pp.
25–33, 2005.
[5] T. Erseghe, “Distributed optimal power flow using ADMM,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 2370–2380, 2014.
[6] Q. Peng and S. H. Low, “Distributed optimal power flow algorithm for
balanced radial distribution networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1404.0700,
2014.
[7] C. Dwork and A. Roth, “The algorithmic foundations of differential
privacy,” Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science,
vol. 9, no. 3–4, pp. 211–407, 2014.
[8] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith, “Calibrating noise
to sensitivity in private data analysis,” in Theory of cryptography
conference. Springer, 2006, pp. 265–284.
[9] K. Chatzikokolakis, M. E. Andrés, N. E. Bordenabe, and C. Palamidessi,
“Broadening the scope of differential privacy using metrics,” in Inter-
national Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium.
Springer, 2013, pp. 82–102.
[10] K. Chaudhuri, C. Monteleoni, and A. D. Sarwate, “Differentially private
empirical risk minimization,” Journal of Machine Learning Research,
vol. 12, no. Mar, pp. 1069–1109, 2011.
[11] T. Zhang and Q. Zhu, “Dynamic differential privacy for ADMM-based
distributed classification learning,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 172–187, 2016.
[12] X. Zhang, M. M. Khalili, and M. Liu, “Improving the privacy
and accuracy of ADMM-based distributed algorithms,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1806.02246, 2018.
[13] F. Zhou, J. Anderson, and S. H. Low, “Differential privacy of aggregated
dc optimal power flow data,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.11237, 2019.
[14] F. Fioretto and P. Van Hentenryck, “Constrained-based differential
privacy: Releasing optimal power flow benchmarks privately,” in In-
ternational Conference on the Integration of Constraint Programming,
Artificial Intelligence, and Operations Research. Springer, 2018, pp.
215–231.
[15] F. Fioretto, T. W. Mak, and P. Van Hentenryck, “Differential privacy for
power grid obfuscation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.06949, 2019.
[16] J. Zhao, T. Jung, Y. Wang, and X. Li, “Achieving differential privacy
of data disclosure in the smart grid,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2014-IEEE
Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE, 2014, pp. 504–512.
[17] S. Han, U. Topcu, and G. J. Pappas, “Differentially private distributed
constrained optimization,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 50–64, 2016.
[18] H. Le Cadre, I. Mezghani, and A. Papavasiliou, “A game-theoretic analy-
sis of transmission-distribution system operator coordination,” European
Journal of Operational Research, vol. 274, no. 1, pp. 317–339, 2019.
[19] S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato, J. Eckstein et al., “Distributed
optimization and statistical learning via the alternating direction method
of multipliers,” Foundations and Trends® in Machine learning, vol. 3,
no. 1, pp. 1–122, 2011.
[20] C. Coffrin, R. Bent, K. Sundar, Y. Ng, and M. Lubin, “PowerModels.jl:
An open-source framework for exploring power flow formulations,” in
2018 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC), June 2018.
[21] I. Dunning, J. Huchette, and M. Lubin, “JuMP: A modeling language for
mathematical optimization,” SIAM Review, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 295–320,
2017.
[22] V. Dvorkin, P. Van Hentenryck, J. Kazempour, and P. Pinson, “Electronic
companion - Differentially private distributed optimal power flow,”
https://github.com/wdvorkin/DP_D_OPF.
This figure "PSCC_logo.png" is available in "png"
 format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/1910.10136v1
